In this paper, we characterize subjective probability beliefs leading to a higher equilibrium market price of risk. We establish that Abel's result on the impact of doubt on the risk premium is not correct in general (see Abel, 2002) . We introduce, on the set of subjective probability beliefs, market-price-of-risk dominance concepts and we relate them to well known dominance concepts used for comparative statics in portfolio choice analysis. In particular, the necessary …rst order conditions on subjective probability beliefs in order to increase the market price of risk for all nondecreasing utility functions appear as equivalent to the monotone likelihood ratio property.
Introduction
We start from an equilibrium model in which the (representative) agent is endowed with a subjective probability Q di¤erent from the initial probability P: We want to measure the impact of this subjective probability on the equilibrium market price of risk. In particular, in relation with the Equity premium puzzle 1 , we are interested in the characterization of the set of subjective probabilities leading to an increase of the market price of risk for all utility functions in a given class.
Starting from the empirical …ndings 2 of Cecchetti et al. (2000) , Abel (2002) has considered a closely related problem. He de…nes pessimism (respectively, doubt) as a First Stochastic Dominance shift (respectively, mean preserving spread) of the representative agent's subjective distribution of aggregate consumption. In order to analyze the impact of pessimism on the equilibrium risk premium, Abel (2002) introduces the stronger notion of uniform pessimism 3 and proves, for a representative agent endowed with a power utility function, that uniform pessimism is a su¢ cient condition for an increase of the equilibrium risk premium. He also proves for power utility functions and using Taylor series expansions that doubt increases the equilibrium risk premium. However this result is not correct in general as shown on a simple couterexample provided in Section 4.
Our aim is to characterize subjective beliefs leading to a higher equilibrium market price of risk for large classes of utility functions. More precisely, according to which class of utility functions we consider, we de…ne the market-price-of-risk dominance of the …rst-order (for all nondecreasing utility functions) and of the second-order (for all nondecreasing and concave utility functions).
In fact, changes in beliefs (probabilities) can be interpreted in terms of changes in risk (random variables) explored among others by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970 a . and b.), Meyer and Ormiston (1983) , Meilijson (1990, 1993) , Hadar and Seo (1990) , Ormiston and Schlee (1993) , Gollier (1995) , Gollier and Schlesinger (2002) .
We show that our …rst-order (respectively, second-order) market-price-of-risk dominance is equivalent, when restated in terms of random variables, to the monotone likelihood ratio dominance (respectively, portfolio dominance) studied by Meilijson (1990, 1993) and Gollier (1997) .
We use these characterizations to provide examples of …rst-order and secondorder market-price-of-risk dominance. In particular, we explore the case where the total wealth is normally or log-normally distributed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of marketprice-of-risk dominance. Section 3 and 4 respectively explore the concepts of …rst-order and second-order market price of risk dominance. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Market-price-of-risk dominance
Let ( ; F; P ) be a given probability space. We consider a standard 2 dates Lucasfruit tree economy, except that we allow the representative agent to have a subjective belief/opinion. The representative agent solves a standard utility maximization problem. He has a current income at date t = 0; 1 denoted by (e 0 ; e) and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for consumption of the form
where Q is a probability measure absolutely continuous with respect to P which corresponds to the subjective belief of the agent: Throughout the paper e is assumed to be nonnegative. If we denote by M the nonnegative density of Q with respect to P , then the utility function can be rewritten as u 0 (c 0 ) + E P [M u(c)] : We suppose that the economy is in equilibrium, i.e. that there exists a nonnegative, nonzero and uniformly bounded price process 4 q such that the optimal consumption plan for the representative agent (under his budget constraint) coincides with the aggregate wealth of the economy, i.e. e = arg max E P [(c 0 e 0 )+q(c e)] 0 u 0 (c 0 ) + E P [M u(c)] . Such an equilibrium, when it exists, can be characterized by the …rst order necessary conditions for individual optimality. When the equilibrium is interior, these conditions are given by M u 0 (e) = u 0 0 (e 0 )q. It is easy to obtain, as in the classical setting, the CCAPM formula. We suppose the existence of a riskless asset with price process S 0 such that S 0 0 = 1 and S 0 1 = 1 + r f for some risk free rate r f . We consider a risky asset with positive price process S and associated rate of return between date 0 and 1 denoted by
In such a context, since qS is a P martingale, we obtain
; R (2.1)
or to
We wish to characterize the set of such probabilities. Note that the probability measures for which the market price of risk increases are those for which the equilibrium relative price (of e) decreases and they are also those for which the equilibrium risk premium in the sense of Abel (2002) increases. Indeed, in the standard model, the equilibrium price p P (e) for e is given by
0 (e 0 ) and the price p P (1) for a riskless asset whose payo¤ is always 1 is given by E P [q] = E P [u 0 (e)] =u 0 0 (e 0 ); hence the equilibrium relative price rp P (e) is given by E P [u 0 (e)e] E P [u 0 (e)] ; which is then to be compared to the equilibrium relative price in the subjective beliefs setting rp Q (e) = E Q [u 0 (e)e] E Q [u 0 (e)] : Besides, in Abel (2002) , the risk premium is de…ned as the ratio between the expected return of the considered asset and the riskfree return, i.e.
so that the equilibrium risk premium in the subjective beliefs setting is higher than in the standard setting if and only if (2:3).
We introduce the following de…nitions. We shall consider the sets U 1 of all continuous nondecreasing functions u on R + such that lim sup x!1 u 0 (x) < 1 and U 2 of all continuous nondecreasing concave 6 functions u on R + : De…nition 2.1. Let e be a nonnegative random variable on and let F be the sigma-algebra generated by e: Let Q 1 and Q 2 denote two probability measures on ( ; F ) such that E Q i [e] < 1, i = 1; 2. We say that Q 1 dominates Q 2 -with respect to e -in the sense of the market price of risk of order i (
Note that we do not refer anymore to an objective probability in this de…nition. However it su¢ ces to consider any probability measure P such that Q 1 and Q 2 are absolutely continuous with respect to P to recover the interpretation of
as the equilibrium relative price of e in a market where the representative agent subjective belief is given by Q 1 (resp. by Q 2 ): Such a probability P can be, for instance, any positive combination of Q 1 and Q 2 :
Remark also that for u in U i such that Q i (u 0 (e) 6 = 0) 6 = 0, i = 1; 2 we have lim sup x!1 u 0 (x) < 1 and since e is integrable,
is well de…ned for x su¢ ciently large: Furthermore this quantity decreases when x goes to zero. Hence
is well de…ned at least as the limit of
when x goes to zero.
Sections 3 and 4 are respectively devoted to …rst-order and second-order marketprice-of-risk dominance.
First-order market-price-of-risk dominance
We …rst show with a counter-example that Abel's concept of pessimism de…ned through First Stochastic Dominance is not su¢ cient to ensure MPR 1 dominance. We then prove the equivalence between M P R 1 dominance and Monotone Likelihood Ratio dominance, introduced by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) and …nally use this characterization to provide examples and interpret the MPR 1 dominance. Abel (2002) uses the term pessimism to mean that the representative agent's subjective distribution of aggregate consumption is …rst-order stochastically dominated by the objective distribution. It has long been shown in the literature that the standard stochastic orders are not su¢ cient in portfolio settings; in particular, a …rst stochastic dominance improvement of the returns of the risky asset needs not generate a higher demand for it (see e.g. Fishburn and Porter, 1976 or Hadar and Seo, 1990) . As a consequence, it is intuititive that a FSD shift, as in Abel (2002) , should not necessarily reduce the equilibrium relative price of the risky asset. We show it on the following simple example.
Suppose that e U [1;3] and that the density of Q with respect to P is given by
It is easy to see on Figure 1 that P dominates Q in the sense of the …rst stochastic dominance. The probability measure Q is then pessimistic in the sense of Abel (2002) .
Let us assume that the representative agent utility function is such that u 0 (x) = 1 x 2 and let us de…ne the probability P u by its density with respect to P; dPu dP = u 0 (e) E P [u 0 (e)] : Since we have u 0 (e) = 0 for e 2, the probability P u does not charge ]2; 3] : On [1; 2] ; f is an increasing function and we have then cov Pu (e; f (e)) > 0:
This then leads to a decrease of the equilibrium risk premium. In fact, we can see through this computation that the spread between
has the same sign as cov Pu (e; f (e)) which is the covariance between dQ dP and e under a probability with a density that is proportional to the marginal utility.
As it can be seen in Figure 2 ., Q is "pessimistic"with respect to P but "optimistic"with respect to P u (since it is almost surely increasing under P u ) and this is the reason why we obtain a decrease of the equilibrium risk premium.
One could argue that this representative agent's utility function is too speci…c since it is not strictly increasing nor strictly concave and that P u is not equivalent to P . However, small perturbations of this function would lead to the same result. Furthermore, we can check that we would obtain the same result for well chosen power utility functions. With the same probabilities P and Q; it is easy to
and it is easy to check that this function is positive for 4:77: Hence, even in the class of utility functions studied in Abel (2002) , the concept of pessimism introduced therein is not su¢ cient to guarantee an increase of the equilibrium risk premium.
Notice that Abel (2002) does not claim that FSD is su¢ cient to ensure marketprice-of-risk dominance for power utility functions. He does not discuss this point; he introduces a stronger concept of pessimism, called uniform pessimism 7 , and proves that this stronger notion is su¢ cient.
The next Proposition characterizes the …rst-order market-price-of-risk dominance. We recall the de…nition of the monotone likelihood ratio order, widely used in the statistical literature and …rst introduced in the context of portfolio problems by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) 8 . A distribution G is said to dominate a distribution F in the sense of the MLR order (G < M LR F ) if there exist numbers 1 x 1 x 2 1 and a nondecreasing function h :
Proposition 3.1. Let Q 1 and Q 2 denote two probability measures on ( ; F ) and let F 1 (resp. F 2 ) denote the distribution of e under Q 1 (resp. Q 2 ). Then
In fact, if we interpret our result in terms of portfolio dominance, we have established that the MLR property is equivalent to the …rst order conditions for portfolio dominance for all agents with nondecreasing utility functions.
With the characterization obtained through Proposition 3.1, the MPR 1 order is now easily veri…able. If e has a normal distribution N ( 1 ; 1 ) (resp. N ( 2 ; 2 )) under Q 1 (resp. under Q 2 ) then Q 1 < M P R 1 Q 2 if and only if 1 = 2 and 1 2 : The lognormal case works similarly 9 .
The comonotonicity condition between dQ 2 dQ 1 and e means that "Q 1 is more pessimistic than Q 2 "in the sense that it puts more weight when aggregate wealth is low. An M P R 1 shift in the subjective beliefs can then be interpreted as a pessimistic shift. In particular, in the case of normal distributions, an M P R 1 shift in the beliefs corresponds to a lower subjective expected value for e with no modi…cation of the risk level. This notion of pessimism is stronger than the one introduced in Abel (2002) since it is immediate and well known that if F 2 < M LR F 1 , then F 2 < F SD F 1 : 7 de…ned by Q (X t) = P X e t for some > 0: 8 More precisely, Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) showed that in the standard portfolio problem a MLR shift in the distribution of returns of the risky asset leads to an increase in demand for the risky asset for all agents with nonincreasing utilities. 9 As underlined by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) , this order holds for exponential type families (exponential, geometric, Poisson, binomial with the same number of trials, Gamma with the same shape parameter). Abel (2002) de…nes doubt as a mean preserving spread of the distribution of growth rates of aggregate consumption. As previously underlined, the common stochastic orders fail to rank demand in portfolio problems, hence it is intuitive that second-order stochastic dominance should not characterize market-price-ofrisk dominance of the second-order. Abel (2002) proves, for power utility functions, and using Taylor series expansions, that doubt reduces the average equity premium. In fact, this result is not correct in general 10 as easily seen on the following simple couterexample. Let us consider 11 = f0:9; 1; 1:1; 2; 25; 48g with P = (0; 1 2 ; 0; 0; 1 2 ; 0) and Q = ( 1 4 ; 0; 1 4 ; 1 4 ; 0; 1 4 ): It is easy to see that Q is a mean preserving spread of P: If we consider the utility function u(x) = 1
Second-order market-price-of-risk dominance
x ; we obtain
E P [u 0 (e)] = 1; 04 and E Q [u 0 (e)e] E Q [u 0 (e)] = 1; 10 which means that the risk premium under Q is lower than under P:
Our aim is to characterize second order market-price-of-risk dominance. With the same notations as in the previous section 12 , let X 1 F 1 and X 2 F 2 . Then, second-order market-price-of-risk dominance, which is given by
for all nondecreasing and concave utility functions u is equivalent to
or equivalently
As shown by Gollier (1997, Condition (6)), this last condition characterizes Portfolio Dominance, a concept introduced in the context of portfolio problems 13 by Landsberger and Meilijson (1993) and further studied by Gollier (1997) . 10 Abel's "proof" is based on second order Taylor expansions and the risk premia are replaced by their approximate estimations. Focusing on the two …rst moments is more or less equivalent to restricting one's attention to normal distributions for which all mean-preserving dominance concept coincide with a variance ranking. However, in general, this procedure is not correct since it neglects the impact of higher order moments. 11 The states of the world are indexed by the values taken by e: 12 We recall that F i denotes the distribution of e under Q i ; i = 1; 2: 13 More precisely, we recall that in the standard portfolio problem, a shift in the distribution of the risky asset is "portfolio dominated" if it reduces the demand for the risky asset for all risk-averse agents, irrespective of the risk free rate. Landsberger and Meilijson (1993) restricted their attention to mean-preserving changes in distribution.
Using Proposition 1 in Gollier (1997), we easily deduce that Q 1 M P R 2 Q 2 if and only if
:
Since this condition is not intuitive and is hard to check, we give in the following some simple necessary or su¢ cient conditions for second-order market-price-of-risk dominance, we relate it to the common …rst and second stochastic dominances, we interpret our dominance concept in terms of pessimism and doubt and illustrate it by simple examples.
Notice …rst that, as shown by Landsberger and Meilijson (1993) , mean preserving spreads are neither su¢ cient nor necessary for portfolio dominance, hence Abel's concept of doubt fails to rank market price of risk under subjective beliefs in a general setting.
It is well known that FSD is neither su¢ cient nor necessary in order to ensure portfolio dominance, and so it is for our concept. In particular, it is immediate to see that if there exists such that, for all : Figures 3 and 4 provide an example in which the previous conditions are satis…ed but not FSD. Moreover, taking = 1; these conditions correspond to FSD, i.e. Q 1 puts more weight on fe xg than Q 2 ; with the additional condition that on fe xg, Q 1 puts more weight on the low values. This condition seems to be closely related to the comonotonicity condition that characterizes the …rst-order market-price-ofrisk dominance but it can be shown on simple examples that these two conditions are not equivalent. Figure 5 provides such an example.
The next Proposition shows that all distributions, which are mean-preserving M P R 2 ordered are also variance ordered. Proposition 4.1. Let Q 1 and Q 2 denote two probability measures on ( ; F ). If
The next proposition provides conditions that ensure second-order marketprice-of-risk dominance. This result is somehow a converse of the result stated in the previous proposition. Indeed, if the probability measures Q 1 and Q 2 satisfy these conditions, then e has the same expectation under the two probabilities and has a higher variance under Q 1 : Proposition 4.2. If the density of e under Q 2 is symmetric (with respect to E Q 2 [e]) and if the density of Q 1 with respect to Q 2 is a function of e; symmetric with respect to E Q 2 [e], nonincreasing before E Q 2 [e] and nondecreasing after
The two previous propositions are consistent with an interpretation of an M P R 2 shift as some form of doubt. However, it is immediate (see e.g. Landsberger and Meilijson, 1993), that our dominance concept implies that for all x; E Q 1 [e j e x] E Q 2 [e j e x] ; which intuitively can be interpreted as some form of pessimism.
As underlined by Landberger and Meilijson (1993), Equal-Mean Normal, Uniform and Shifted Exponential distributions are mean-preserving portfolio ordered (hence M P R 2 ordered) by their variances. Moreover, we have the following result. Note that in the lognormal case, we also have that if Q 1 < M P R 2 Q 2 ; then 1 2 and 1 2 (it su¢ ces to consider power utility functions).
Conclusion
In this paper, we determine characteristics of the representative agent subjective belief that have an unambiguous impact on the market price of risk. In relation to the risk premium puzzle (see Mehra-Prescott, 1985 or Kocherlakota, 1996 for a survey on the risk premium puzzle), we focus on characteristics that lead to an increase of the market price of risk for any utility function in a given class. When we consider the class of nondecreasing utility functions, the market price of risk is increased for pessimistic beliefs where the concept of pessimism is related to the Monotone Likelihood Ratio dominance. For the class of nondecreasing concave utility functions, we introduce a second order dominance concept that may be interpreted in terms of doubt and that is related to the portfolio dominance concept. We characterize this second order dominance concept in the speci…c class of normal and lognormal distributions. We also provide generic examples.
Our results may be interesting in light of the risk premium puzzle when they are combined with the evidence of pessimism in investors forecasts found by Giordani and Söderlind (2006) . Two questions that are directly related to our framework remain open. It would be interesting to explore, in a general equilibrium framework, the conditions on the individual beliefs characteristics that would lead to pessimism or doubt at the representative agent level. It would also be interesting to explore further the concept of second order market-price-of-risk dominance and to provide simple characterizations of this concept for other classes of distributions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
1. Let us assume that Q 1 and Q 2 are equivalent and that
E Q 2 [u 0 (e)] for any u in U 1 . Since F is generated by e; dQ 2 dQ 1 can be written in the form dQ 2 dQ 1 = h (e). Let us prove that the function h is nondecreasing, or more precisely that the random variable ' de…ned on (R 2 ; B (R 2 )) by ' (x 1 ; x 2 ) = h (x 2 ) h (x 1 ) is P e P e almost surely nonnegative on the open half plane f(x 1 ; x 2 ) ; x 1 < x 2 g .
Let us assume on the contrary that there exist two Borel real sets A 1 and A 2 such that 14 A 1 < A 2 , P e (A i ) 6 = 0; i = 1; 2 and ' is P e P e almost surely negative on A 1 A 2 . We can choose A 1 and A 2 such that h (A 1 ) [a; a + "] and h (A 2 ) [b "; b] for some a > b and 0 < " < a b:
We have then Q 2 (e2A 1 )
: Let > 0 be given and let =
and for 2 Q 1 (A 1 )
; we obtain Q 2 (A 1 )
: It follows then that for such ; dQ 2 dQ 1 is higher (resp. lower) than
Let denote some real number in [sup A 1 ; inf A 2 ] and let the utility function u be de…ned by u 0 (x) = 1 A 1 + 1 A 2 : We have
on A 2 and one of these inequalities is strict. Hence
For the same reason, we have
Since co(A 1 ) and co(A 2 ) are disjoint and convex, we have co(A 2 ) < co(A 1 ) which leads to A 2 < A 1 :
Let us now de…ne x 1 inf fx : Q 1 (e > x) = 0g and let A ( 1; x 1 ") for some " > 0 such that Q 1 (e 2 A) = 0: By construction, Q 1 (e 2 [x 1 "; x 1 ]) 6 = 0. If we assume Q 2 (e 2 A) 6 = 0; we have [x 1 "; x 1 ] < A and this is impossible. We have then Q 2 (e 2 A) = 0: Consequently, for all " > 0; Q 2 j fe x 1 "g is absolutely continuous with respect to Q 1 j fe x 1 "g ; hence Q 2 j fe<x 1 g is absolutely continuous with respect to Q 1 j fe<x 1 g .
Symmetrically, if we de…ne x 0 2 = sup fx : Q 2 (e < x) = 0g ; we obtain that Q 1 j fx 0 2 <eg is absolutely continuous with respect to Q 2 j fx 0 2 <eg : If x 0 2 > x 1 , we take x 2 = x 1 and h = 0 and we have 1 x 2 x 1 1, Q 2 (e < x 2 ) = 0; Q 1 (e > x 1 ) = 0; Q 2 j fx 2 e x 1 g is absolutely continuous with respect to Q 1 j fx 2 e x 1 g and
If x 0 2 x 1 ;we take x 2 = x 0 2 and Q 2 j fx 2 e x 1 g and Q 1 j fx 2 e x 1 g are equivalent. The same argument as in 1. gives us then the existence of a nondecreasing nonnegative function h such that
If Q 1 (e = x 1 ) = 0 (resp. 6 = 0) and Q 2 (e = x 1 ) = 0 (resp. 6 = 0) then the previous reasoning can be extended to fx 2 < e x 1 g : If Q 1 (e = x 1 ) = 0 and Q 2 (e = x 1 ) 6 = 0 then it su¢ ces to take h (x 1 ) = 1: Finally, it is easy to check that we can not have Q 1 (e = x 1 ) 6 = 0 and Q 2 (e = x 1 ) = 0: The point x 2 is treated analogously.
In order to establish the converse implication, it su¢ ces to prove, for A = fx 2 e x 1 g ; that
Remark that this quantity is not modi…ed if we replace Q 1 ; Q 2 and u 0 (e) by Q 1 j fx 2 e x 1 g ; Q 2 j fx 2 e x 1 g and u 0 (e) 1 fx 2 e x 1 g : The result is then a direct consequence of 1. Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let us …rst assume that e has a …nite support and let e be such that P fe eg = 0: Taking u 0 (x) = ( e x)1 x e , we have : If e does not have a …nite support, we still take u 0 (x) = ( e x)1 x e for some e. Since E Q 1 [e 2 1 e e ] (resp. E Q 2 [e 2 1 e e ] ) converges to E Q 1 [e 2 ] (resp. E Q 2 [e 2 ]) when e goes to in…nity, we have for " > 0 given and for e su¢ ciently large E Q i e k e k 2 " E Q i e k 1 e e E Q i e k ; k = 0; 1; 2; i = 1; 2 (5.1)
FIGURES Figure 1
This …gure represents the distribution functions of Q (dashed line) and P (solid line). This …gure represents the density of P u (solid line) as well as the density of Q with respect to P: E Q 2 [e1 e x ] and Q 1 fe xg Q 2 fe xg but without the …rst-order stochastic dominance. More precisely, we have e = (0; 1; 2), Q 1 = ( 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 3 ) and Q 2 = ( 1 8 ; 5 8 ; 2 8 ): In the …rst …gure, the solid (resp. dashed) thin line represents the distribution function of Q 2 (resp. Q 1 ). The solid (resp. dashed) thick line represents the function E Q 1 [e1 e x ] (resp. E Q 2 [e1 e x ]): We clearly do not have …rst stochastic dominance. In the second …gure, the dashed lines are the same as in the previous one and the solid lines correspond to Q 1 [e x] and E Q 1 [e1 e x ] with = 16 18 . This …gure represents a situation where E Q 1 [e1 e x ] E Q 2 [e1 e x ] and Q 1 fe xg Q 2 fe xg but where the comonotonicity condition is not satis…ed. More precisely, we have e = (0; 1; 2), Q 1 = ( 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 3 ) and Q 2 = ( 1 8 ; 4 8 ; 3 8 ): The solid (resp. dashed) thin line represents the distribution function of Q 2 (resp. Q 1 ). The solid (resp. dashed) thick line represents the function E Q 1 [e1 e x ] (resp. E Q 2 [e1 e x ]): The thin (resp. thick) dashed line is clearly above (resp. below) the solid one. The dot-dash line represents dQ 1 dQ 2 and is clearly nonmonotone. 
